There are many different types of commanders in the Army National Guard. Within most states, there are company, battalion, and brigade commanders. In some states, there are division commanders. Also, all states have an Adjutant General, who is the state military commander.

As a Captain, you would serve as a company commander responsible for 100-200 soldiers.

As a Lieutenant Colonel, you would serve as a Battalion Commander, responsible for 400-700 soldiers.

As a Colonel, you would lead a Brigade and be responsible for 1,800-5,000 soldiers.

As a Major General, you could be a Division Commander in charge of 10,000 to 15,000 troops. Or, you could be the Adjutant General in charge of the entire state military department.

As you can see, there are many different types of commanders within the National Guard.

Most of these leaders are part-time, Citizen Soldiers. They maintain civilian jobs or businesses full-time and tend to their military duties part-time. Most commanders have a full-time AGR staff that handles day to day life within their unit.

As a commander, you can expect to drill one weekend a month minimum. In addition, you will probably visit your unit once per week or more. Also, you will attend meetings and phone conferences.

In essence, you have the same responsibility as an Active Duty Commander, but you have less time to complete your tasks. It is a challenge, but in my opinion, it’s worth it.

The biggest benefit is improving your leadership skills, serving your state and leading soldiers. It’s an experience I will never forget.

The news stories from Pakistan have been bad across the board for quite some time now. Recent days have seen the TTP-led forces within 70 km of Islamabad, “peace” deals in Swat and a rising tide of attacks on major cities. However, all is not lost for the Pakistan Army. In fact, all was never lost; it has been a carefully planned strategic move on the part of General Kayani.

Pakistan Army offensives have thus far been successful, and are likely to cut off Swat from TTP reinforcements from the South. Bajaur-Malakand-Buner axis would leave the Pakistani Taliban in Swat dissected from their friends in Mohmand Agency. The Swat Valley has very few exits and is accessible mainly from the South and North, with limited access to Shangla to the East and Dir to the West. All of which can theoretically be closed by the Pakistan Army.

The TTP have underestimated the Pakistan Army and overestimated their position and moved towards more conventional ground holding operations over classic guerrilla too quickly. They are likely to pay the price in blood, and complete loss of their northern flank. The only silver lining for the TTP will be the use of massive American weaponry including borrowed choppers that are likely to be used in such an operation. This would equate the Pakistan Army=stooges of America.

The Pakistani game plan has been masterminded by General Kayani, who is now emerging as a seasoned chess-player and a veritable Pakistani Putin. He has deftly fixed the political crisis without directly interfering in the affairs of the state. “The Kayani Model”, a term coined by former Chief of Army Staff Jehangir Karamat, represents a new framework for the Pakistan Army. As Karamat puts it, – “invisible but around, fully informed and acting through well timed and effective influence”.

In a parallel development, a new consensus appears to be emerging, that can be called the “Zaid Hamid Consensus” that charts out a broad policy of independence from the US and an Islamic state in the philosophical lineage of Allama Iqbal rather than a Taliban/Salafi style interpretation. This consensus, if it can gain critical mass, could prove to be an antidote to both foreign designs against the country as well as the internal threat of the Salafists and terrorists.

The Americans are also in the game. The American game plan is represented by a rehash of the “Sunni Awakening” strategy in Iraq under the brand name of “Sunni Tahreek” a so-called Deobandi outfit. This is perhaps the biggest danger for Pakistan, as it will in the long-term move the battle from far flung and remote areas to the city centers of the country in a rehash of Iraq post US conquest, with the violence, militias and terror that it accompanied. With the political government’s cooperation and US funding, this could easily turn very nasty.